What constitutes a convention? Implications for the coexistence of conventions
A model of repeated play of a coordination game, where stage games have a location in social space, and players receive noisy signals of the true location of their games, is reviewed. Sugden (1995) suggests that in such a model, there can be a stationary state of convention coexistence only if interaction is non-uniform across social space. This paper shows that an alternative definition of conventions, which links conventions to actions rather than expectations, permits convention coexistence when interaction is uniform. To assess robustness, the concept of a global mutant is introduced, to which certain states of coexistence are robust.
|Date of creation:||2004|
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- H. Peyton Young, 1996. "The Economics of Convention," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 105-122, Spring.
- Sugden, Robert, 1995. "The coexistence of conventions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 241-256, October.
- Aderlini, L. & Ianni, A., 1993.
"Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbours,"
186, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
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