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Do Couples Bargain over Fertility? Evidence Based on Child Preference Data

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  • Timo Hener

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Abstract

Empirical literature has found evidence in favour of household bargaining models. In contrast to earlier tests that are limited to assignable private goods, we use child preference data in order to extend the empirical evidence on household bargaining to public household goods. In the empirical analysis, we exploit the different theoretical predictions for couples with heterogeneous and homogeneous preferences derived from household models. Our results indicate that couples bargain over fertility. Furthermore, we find that the ability to commit to household resource allocations depends on the gender of the partner with higher preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Timo Hener, 2010. "Do Couples Bargain over Fertility? Evidence Based on Child Preference Data," ifo Working Paper Series 92, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifowps:_92
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John Ermisch & Chiara Pronzato, 2008. "Intra-Household Allocation of Resources: Inferences from Non-resident Fathers' Child Support Payments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(527), pages 347-362, March.
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    7. Guy Laroque & Bernard Salanié, 2004. "Fertility and Financial Incentives in France," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 50(3), pages 423-450.
    8. Ai, Chunrong & Norton, Edward C., 2003. "Interaction terms in logit and probit models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 123-129, July.
    9. Nancy Qian, 2008. "Missing Women and the Price of Tea in China: The Effect of Sex-Specific Earnings on Sex Imbalance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 123(3), pages 1251-1285.
    10. Anne Gauthier, 2007. "The impact of family policies on fertility in industrialized countries: a review of the literature," Population Research and Policy Review, Springer;Southern Demographic Association (SDA), vol. 26(3), pages 323-346, June.
    11. Rasul, Imran, 2008. "Household bargaining over fertility: Theory and evidence from Malaysia," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 215-241, June.
    12. Alessandro Cigno & Luca Casolaro & Furio C. Rosati, 2002. "The Impact of Social Security on Saving and Fertility in Germany," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 59(2), pages 189-189, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marcus Klemm, 2012. "Job Security and Fertility: Evidence from German Reunification," Ruhr Economic Papers 0379, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    2. Mizuki Komura, 2013. "Fertility and endogenous gender bargaining power," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 26(3), pages 943-961, July.
    3. Fabian Kindermann & Matthias Doepke, 2014. "Bargaining over Babies," 2014 Meeting Papers 670, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    4. Fan Elliott & Maitra Pushkar, 2013. "Women Rule: Preferences and Fertility in Australian Households," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-30, April.
    5. Abir, Raphael & Boll, Christina & Bonin, Holger & Gerlach, Irene & Hank, Karsten & Laß, Inga & Nehrkorn-Ludwig, Marc-André & Reich, Nora & Reuß, Karsten & Schnabel, Reinhold & Stichnoth, Holger & Wilk, 2014. "Evaluation der Wirkung ehe- und familienbezogener Leistungen auf die Geburtenrate/Erfüllung von Kinderwünschen. Endbericht. Gutachten für die Prognos AG," ZEW Expertises, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research, number 110573.
    6. Alexander Kemnitz & Marcel Thum, 2015. "Gender Power, Fertility, and Family Policy," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(1), pages 220-247, January.
    7. Klemm, Marcus, 2012. "Job Security and Fertility: Evidence from German Reunification," Ruhr Economic Papers 379, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    8. Mizuki Komura, 2013. "Tax reform and endogenous gender bargaining power," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 175-192, June.
    9. repec:zbw:rwirep:0379 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Komura, Mizuki & Ogawa, Hikaru, 2014. "Pension and the Family," IZA Discussion Papers 8479, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fertility; child preferences; intra-household allocation; bargaining; limited commitment.;

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy

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