Policy Persistence and Rent Extraction
The existing literature has shown that special interest groups can have both growthenhancing and retarding effects on an economy. In either case it is always assumed thatthe nature of the special interest groups remains constant over time. The hypothesis ofthis paper is that a dynamic relationship exists between politicians and lobbyists. A theoreticalframework in which established and new lobbies overlap is developed to modelthe incentives a government might have to behave in a manner consistent with thehypothesis. In this structure despite the fact that they support projects from which allproductive benefits have been extracted politicians are still rationally reelected.
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- Le Breton, Michel & Salanie, Francois, 2003. "Lobbying under political uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2589-2610, December.
- Anderson, James E., 1998.
"The Uruguay Round and welfare in some distorted agricultural economies,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 393-410, August.
- James E. Anderson, 1997. "The Uruguay Round and Welfare in Some Distorted Agricultural Economies," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 360, Boston College Department of Economics.
- James E. Anderson, 1997. "The Uruguay Round and Welfare in Some Distorted Agricultural Economies," NBER Working Papers 5923, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aidt, T. & Hillman, A., 2008.
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
0802, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Aidt, T. & Dutta, J. & Loukoianova, E., 2003. "Policy Myopia," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0344, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
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