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Delaying Integration of Immigrant Labor for the Purpose of Taxation

  • Wolfram F. Richter

Delayed Integration ("DI") is a rule for taxing migrants. It requires that immigrants be taxed in the receiving country only after some period of transition. Conversely, emigrants are released from the obligation to pay home taxes only after a certain period. DI is an alternative to the Employment Principle and the Origin Principle. The former governs the international taxation of labor while a close substitute to the latter - the Nationality Principle - is underlying U.S. tax law. The paper studies the potential merits of DI in a setting which allows one to trade off the social cost of tax distortion and the social cost of wasteful government.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 802.

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Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_802
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  1. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1993. "How Much Europe? Subsidiarity, Centralization and Fiscal Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 834, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Richter, Wolfram F., 2002. "Social Security and Taxation of Labour Subject to Subsidiarity and Freedom of Movement," IZA Discussion Papers 490, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996. "Tax competition and Leviathan," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January.
  4. Razin,Assaf & Sadka,Efraim, 2001. "Labor, Capital, and Finance," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521780742.
  5. Pauly, Mark V., 1973. "Income redistribution as a local public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 35-58, February.
  6. Michel, Ph. & Pestieau, P. & Vidal, J. -P., 1998. "Labor migration and redistribution with alternative assimilation policies: The small economy case," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 363-377, May.
  7. Michael Rauscher, 2000. "Interjurisdictional Competition and Public-Sector Prodigality: The Triumph of the Market over the State?," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(1), pages 89-, September.
  8. Michael Keen & David E. Wildasin, 2000. "Pareto Efficiency in International Taxation," CESifo Working Paper Series 371, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. Wolfram F. Richter, 2001. "Delayed Integration of Mobile Labor: A Principle for Coordinating Taxation, Social Security, and Social Assistance," CESifo Working Paper Series 624, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. David E. Wildasin, 2000. "Labor-Market Integration, Investment in Risky Human Capital, and Fiscal Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 73-95, March.
  11. Wallace E. Oates, 2002. "Fiscal and Regulatory Competition: Theory and Evidence," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 3(4), pages 377-390, November.
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