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Dynamic Games of Common-Property Resource Exploitation When Self-Image Matters

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  • Ngo Van Long

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to model the influence of Kantian moral scruples in a dynamic environment. Our objectives are two-fold. Firstly, we investigate how a Nash equilibrium among agents who have moral scruples may ensure that the exploitation of a common property renewable resource is Pareto efficient at every point of time. Secondly, we outline a prototype model that shows, in an overlapping generation framework, how a community’s sense of morality may evolve over time and identifies conditions under which the community may reach a steady state level of morality in which everyone is perfectly Kantian.

Suggested Citation

  • Ngo Van Long, 2019. "Dynamic Games of Common-Property Resource Exploitation When Self-Image Matters," CESifo Working Paper Series 7880, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7880
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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