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Voluntary Provision of a Public Good and Individual Morality

  • Bilodeau, M.
  • Gravel, N.

This paper examines some consequences of the assumption that individuals constrain morally their behaviour in games in general and in games of voluntary provision of public good in particular. Moral behaviour is defined in terms of a maxim which assigns one moral action to every player. Maxims themselves are defined with respect to a system of moral equivalence between individual actions referred to as a system of moral universalization.

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Paper provided by Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. in its series Papers with number 9731.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9731
Contact details of provider: Postal: THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX.

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  1. Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1995. "On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 58-81, March.
  2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1975. "Macroeconomic Constraints, Economic Efficiency and Ethics: An Introduction to Kantian Economics," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 42(168), pages 430-37, November.
  3. Shitovitz, Benyamin & Spiegel, Menahem, 1998. "Cournot-Nash and Lindahl Equilibria in Pure Public Good Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 1-18, November.
  4. Milleron, Jean-Claude, 1972. "Theory of value with public goods: A survey article," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 419-477, December.
  5. Guttman, Joel M, 1978. "Understanding Collective Action: Matching Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 251-55, May.
  6. Sugden, Robert, 1984. "Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376), pages 772-87, December.
  7. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000381, David K. Levine.
  8. Young, Douglas J., 1989. "A `fair share' model of public good provision," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 137-147, January.
  9. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
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