IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_719.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Political Economy of Collective Bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • Tapio Palokangas

Abstract

We construct a political equilibrium in which employers and labour unions bargain over labour contracts, wage-earners and profit-earners lobby the government for taxation and labour market regulation, and labour market legislation must be accepted by the majority of voters. We show that the voters rule out profit sharing, because otherwise the government would capture all the gain. Furthermore, if it is much easier to tax wages than profits, then the government protects union power by regulation in the labour market. In such a case, the political equilibrium is characterized by strong union power and right-to-manage bargaining, which causes involuntary unemployment.

Suggested Citation

  • Tapio Palokangas, 2002. "The Political Economy of Collective Bargaining," CESifo Working Paper Series 719, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_719
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/719.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gene M. Grossman (ed.), 1996. "Economic Growth," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, volume 0, number 553.
    2. Olivier Blanchard & Francesco Giavazzi, 2003. "Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and Deregulation in Goods and Labor Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 118(3), pages 879-907.
    3. Palokangas, Tapio, 2003. "The political economy of collective bargaining," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 253-264, April.
    4. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    6. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-769, August.
    7. Palokangas,Tapio, 2010. "Labour Unions, Public Policy and Economic Growth," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521144056.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Palokangas, Tapio, 2003. "The political economy of collective bargaining," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 253-264, April.
    2. Palokangas, Tapio K., 2003. "Foreign Direct Investment, Labour Market Regulation and Self-Interested Governments," IZA Discussion Papers 793, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    3. Tapio Palokangas, 2004. "Integration, Wage Bargaining, and Growth with Creative Destruction," DEGIT Conference Papers c009_015, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
    4. Palokangas, Tapio K., 2015. "The Welfare Effects of Globalization with Labor Market Regulation," IZA Discussion Papers 9412, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    5. Tapio Palokangas, 2009. "Investment, expropriation, and unionization," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 27-42, January.
    6. repec:kap:jincot:v:17:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s10842-017-0244-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Tapio Palokangas, 2008. "Self-Interested Governments, Unionization, and Legal and Illegal Immigration," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 007-020, March.
    8. Palokangas, Tapio K., 2014. "The Political Economy of Labor Market Regulation with R&D," IZA Discussion Papers 8147, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    regulation; lobbying; collective bargaining;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_719. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Klaus Wohlrabe). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.