IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_6937.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Feldstein Meets George: Land Rent Taxation and Socially Optimal Allocation in Economies with Environmental Externality

Author

Listed:
  • Nguyen Thang Dao
  • Ottmar Edenhofer

Abstract

We consider an overlapping generations (OLG) economy with land as a fixed factor of production and an environmental externality on production in which tax revenue from land rent and/or from other schemes such as labor income, capital income, and production taxation can be used for environmental protection through investment in emission mitigation. We show that, for any given target of stationary stock of pollution, the land rent taxation scheme leads to a higher steady state capital accumulation than the other schemes, and hence the steady state consumption of agents when young under this scheme is also higher than under the others. In addition, under an ambitious mitigation target when the efficiency of the mitigation technology is relatively high compared to the dirtiness of production, the land rent taxation also provides a higher steady state consumption when old, resulting in higher social welfare, than the others. In the second part of the paper, we propose a period-by-period balanced budget policy, which includes land rent and capital income taxes with intergenerational transfers, to decentralize the socially optimal allocation during the transitional phase to the social planner's steady state.

Suggested Citation

  • Nguyen Thang Dao & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2018. "Feldstein Meets George: Land Rent Taxation and Socially Optimal Allocation in Economies with Environmental Externality," CESifo Working Paper Series 6937, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6937
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp6937.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Romer, Paul M, 1986. "Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(5), pages 1002-1037, October.
    2. Quentin Grafton, R. & Kompas, Tom & Van Long, Ngo, 2012. "Substitution between biofuels and fossil fuels: Is there a green paradox?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 328-341.
    3. Calvo, Guillermo A & Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Rodriguez, Carlos Alfredo, 1979. "The Incidence of a Tax on Pure Rent: A New (?) Reason for an Old Answer," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(4), pages 869-874, August.
    4. Ottmar Edenhofer & Linus Mattauch & Jan Siegmeier, 2015. "Hypergeorgism: When Rent Taxation Is Socially Optimal," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 71(4), pages 474-505, December.
    5. Behrens, Kristian & Kanemoto, Yoshitsugu & Murata, Yasusada, 2015. "The Henry George Theorem in a second-best world," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 34-51.
    6. Nguyen Thang Dao & Julio Dávila, 2014. "Implementing Steady State Efficiency in Overlapping Generations Economies with Environmental Externalities," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(4), pages 620-649, August.
    7. John, A & Pecchenino, R, 1994. "An Overlapping Generations Model of Growth and the Environment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(427), pages 1393-1410, November.
    8. repec:eee:jmacro:v:55:y:2018:i:c:p:253-273 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Marko Koethenbuerger & Panu Poutvaara, 2009. "Rent taxation and its intertemporal welfare effects in a small open economy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(5), pages 697-709, October.
    10. Howarth, Richard B & Norgaard, Richard B, 1992. "Environmental Valuation under Sustainable Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 473-477, May.
    11. Feldstein, Martin S, 1977. "The Surprising Incidence of a Tax on Pure Rent: A New Answer to an Old Question," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(2), pages 349-360, April.
    12. Chamley, Christophe & Wright, Brian D., 1987. "Fiscal incidence in an overlapping generations model with a fixed asset," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 3-24, February.
    13. Petrucci, Alberto, 2006. "The incidence of a tax on pure rent in a small open economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 921-933, May.
    14. Richard J. Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1979. "Aggregate Land Rents, Expenditure on Public Goods, and Optimal City Size," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 471-500.
    15. van der Ploeg, Frederick & Withagen, Cees, 2012. "Is there really a green paradox?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 342-363.
    16. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2008. "Public policies against global warming: a supply side approach," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(4), pages 360-394, August.
    17. Antonio Rangel, 2005. "How to Protect Future Generations Using Tax-Base Restrictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 314-346, March.
    18. Linus Mattauch & Jan Siegmeier & Ottmar Edenhofer & Felix Creutzig, 2013. "Financing Public Capital through Land Rent Taxation: A Macroeconomic Henry George Theorem," CESifo Working Paper Series 4280, CESifo Group Munich.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Feldstein Meets George: Land Rent Taxation and Socially Optimal Allocation in Economies with Environmental Externality
      by Christian Zimmermann in NEP-DGE blog on 2018-04-26 19:12:10

    More about this item

    Keywords

    overlapping generations economy; land rent; taxation; socially optimal allocation;

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being
    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6937. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Klaus Wohlrabe). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.