IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_6734.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Monetary Policy, Inequality and Political Instability

Author

Listed:
  • Pablo Duarte
  • Gunther Schnabl

Abstract

Based on the concepts of justice by Hayek, Rawls and Buchanan we argue that the growing political dissatisfaction in industrialized countries is rooted in the asymmetric pattern in monetary policies since the 1980s for two reasons. First, the structurally declining interest rates and the unconventional monetary policy measures have granted privileges to specific groups. Second, the increasingly expansionary monetary policies have negative growth effects, which reduce the scope for compensation of the ones excluded from the privileges. The result is the fading acceptance of the economic order and growing political instability.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Duarte & Gunther Schnabl, 2017. "Monetary Policy, Inequality and Political Instability," CESifo Working Paper Series 6734, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6734
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp6734.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, 2005. "Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1144-1166, September.
    2. Inglehart, Ronald F. & Norris, Pippa, 2016. "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash," Working Paper Series 16-026, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    3. Gunther Schnabl, 2015. "Monetary Policy and Structural Decline: Lessons from Japan for the European Crisis," Asian Economic Papers, MIT Press, vol. 14(1), pages 124-150, Winter/Sp.
    4. Christoph Lakner & Branko Milanovic, 2016. "Global Income Distribution: From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to the Great Recession," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 30(2), pages 203-232.
    5. James M. Buchanan, 1954. "Individual Choice in Voting and the Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 334-334.
    6. Ottmar Issing, 2006. "Central Bank Independence - Economic and Political Dimensions," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 196(1), pages 66-76, April.
    7. Andreas Hoffmann & Gunther Schnabl, 2011. "A Vicious Cycle of Manias, Crises and Asymmetric Policy Responses – An Overinvestment View," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(3), pages 382-403, March.
    8. Kornai, Janos, 1993. "The Evolution of Financial Discipline under the Postsocialist System," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 315-336.
    9. Milton Friedman & Anna J. Schwartz, 1963. "A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number frie63-1, January.
    10. Ricardo J. Caballero & Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap, 2008. "Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(5), pages 1943-1977, December.
    11. Caplan, Bryan, 2001. "Rational Ignorance versus Rational Irrationality," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(1), pages 3-26.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hayek; Rawls; Buchanan; privileges; inequality; monetary policy; order of rules; difference principle; economic order;

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6734. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Klaus Wohlrabe). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.