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Monitoring, Cross Subsidies, and Universal Banking

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  • Jay Pil Choi
  • Christodoulos Stefanadis

Abstract

We formalize the idea that a financial conglomerate may utilize commercial banking activities to cross-subsidize investment banking through bundled offers. The investment banking sector entails supra-normal profits due to incentive problems with security underwriting. Universal banks may aim to capture (some of) those profits by providing discounts on commercial loans. This practice has an adverse effect on commercial banks’ monitoring incentives, encouraging the pursuit of private rents by entrepreneurs. It also leads to lower underwriting fees and a lower probability of successful public offerings. The social welfare effects of universal banking can be either positive or negative.

Suggested Citation

  • Jay Pil Choi & Christodoulos Stefanadis, 2015. "Monitoring, Cross Subsidies, and Universal Banking," CESifo Working Paper Series 5507, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5507
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Giovanni Villani & Marta Biancardi, 2023. "An Evolutionary Game to Study Banks–Firms Relationship: Monitoring Intensity and Private Benefit," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(3), pages 1075-1093, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    universal banking; moral hazard; monitoring; cross subsidy; bundled offer;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

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