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Asymmetric Content Moderation in Search Markets: The Case of Adult Websites

Author

Listed:
  • Leonardo Madio
  • Matthew Mitchell
  • Martin Quinn
  • Carlo Reggiani

Abstract

We study the competitive impact of content moderation by a dominant online platform. We exploit an exogenous shock that led the largest adult content platform to remove all non-verified content, eliminating 80% of its video library. Using a difference-in-differences approach and leveraging on daily website-country level traffic data, we find that this policy resulted in a 41% drop in traffic within one month, suggesting strong user preferences for the removed content. However, much of the displaced traffic was absorbed by competing platforms, including both mainstream rivals and less regulated fringe websites. Over six months, fringe sites experienced a 55% increase in visits, far outpacing the 10% growth of mainstream competitors. Search engines played a critical role in this reallocation: fringe platforms saw a surge in traffic from search referrals and aggregators, as users actively sought alternative content sources. We document an intensification of competition in search: the leading platform became more aggressive towards copyright-infringing rivals, strategically using DMCA filings to remove competing content from search results. Our findings highlight how asymmetric exposure to content moderation shocks can reshape market competition, drive consumers toward less regulated spaces, and alter substitution patterns across platforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonardo Madio & Matthew Mitchell & Martin Quinn & Carlo Reggiani, 2025. "Asymmetric Content Moderation in Search Markets: The Case of Adult Websites," CESifo Working Paper Series 11842, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11842
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Michael McRae, 2025. "Vertical Governance of Online Speech: Evidence from Google's Moderation Mandate," Trinity Economics Papers tep1425, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
    • O39 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Other

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