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Monetary Exchange with Multilateral Matching

Author

Listed:
  • Benoit Julien

    () (Economics Australian Graduate School of Management)

  • John Kennes
  • Ian King

Abstract

This paper analyzes monetary exchange in a search model allowing for multilateral matches to be formed, according to a standard urn-ball process. We consider three physical environments: indivisible goods and money, divisible goods and indivisible money, and divisible goods and money. We compare the results with Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), Trejos and Wright (1995), and Lagos and Wright (2005) respectively. We …nd that the multilateral matching setting generates very simple and intuitive equilibrium allocations that are similar to those in the other papers, but which have important di¤erences. In particular, sur- plus maximization can be achieved in this setting, in equilibrium, with a positive money supply. Moreover, with ‡exible prices and directed search, the …rst best allocation can be attained through price posting or through auctions with lotteries, but not through auctions without lotteries. Finally, analysis of the case of divisible goods and money can be performed without the assumption of large families (as in Shi (1997)) or the day and night structure of Lagos and Wright (2005)

Suggested Citation

  • Benoit Julien & John Kennes & Ian King, 2006. "Monetary Exchange with Multilateral Matching," 2006 Meeting Papers 883, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed006:883
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    File URL: http://repec.org/sed2006/up.30635.1140065480.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Miguel Molico, 2006. "The Distribution Of Money And Prices In Search Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(3), pages 701-722, August.
    2. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November.
    3. Peter Rupert & Martin Schindler & Andrei Shevchenko & Randall Wright, 2000. "The search-theoretic approach to monetary economics: a primer," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q IV, pages 10-28.
    4. Wallace, Neil, 2001. "Whither Monetary Economics?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(4), pages 847-869, November.
    5. Shi Shougong, 1995. "Money and Prices: A Model of Search and Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 467-496, December.
    6. Benoit Julien & John Kennes & Ian King, 2000. "Bidding for Labor," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(4), pages 619-649, October.
    7. Arthur J. Hosios, 1990. "On The Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 279-298.
    8. Moen, Espen R, 1997. "Competitive Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 385-411, April.
    9. Berentsen, Aleksander & Molico, Miguel & Wright, Randall, 2002. "Indivisibilities, Lotteries, and Monetary Exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 70-94, November.
    10. Guillaume Rocheteau & Randall Wright, 2005. "Money in Search Equilibrium, in Competitive Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(1), pages 175-202, January.
    11. Kenneth Burdett & Shouyong Shi & Randall Wright, 2001. "Pricing and Matching with Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 1060-1085, October.
    12. Halko, Marja-Liisa & Kultti, Klaus & Niinimaki, Juha-Pekka, 2007. "Evolutionary stability of trading rules in an urn-ball matching model," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 11-15, March.
    13. Shouyong Shi, 1997. "A Divisible Search Model of Fiat Money," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(1), pages 75-102, January.
    14. Trejos, Alberto & Wright, Randall, 1995. "Search, Bargaining, Money, and Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 118-141, February.
    15. Lu, Xiaohua & McAfee, R. Preston, 1996. "The Evolutionary Stability of Auctions over Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 228-254, August.
    16. Curtis, Elisabeth & Wright, Randall, 2004. "Price setting, price dispersion, and the value of money: or, the law of two prices," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(8), pages 1599-1621, November.
    17. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1993. "A Search-Theoretic Approach to Monetary Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 63-77, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; Money; Directed Search;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General

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