A Trace of Anger is Enough: On the Enforcement of Social Norms
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- Jakub Steiner, 2007. "A trace of anger is enough: on the enforcement of social norms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(1), pages 1-4.
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More about this item
KeywordsReciprocity; Emotions; Commitment; Punishment; Public Good.;
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-04-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2005-04-24 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CBE-2005-04-24 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2005-04-24 (Evolutionary Economics)
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