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A trace of anger is enough: on the enforcement of social norms

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  • Jakub Steiner

    (The University of Edinburgh)

Abstract

It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost selfish players may behave as strong reciprocators.

Suggested Citation

  • Jakub Steiner, 2007. "A trace of anger is enough: on the enforcement of social norms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(1), pages 1-4.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07h40001
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer.
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    6. Jakub Steiner, 2006. "Strong Enforcement by a Weak Authority," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 149, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. James Andreoni & Laura K. Gee, 2011. "Gun For Hire: Does Delegated Enforcement Crowd out Peer Punishment in Giving to Public Goods?," NBER Working Papers 17033, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Gaechter, S. & Mengel, F. & Tsakas, E. & Vostroknutov, A., 2013. "Growth and inequality in public good games," Research Memorandum 070, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    3. Libor Dušek & Andreas Ortmann & Lubomír Lízal, 2005. "Understanding Corruption and Corruptibility Through Experiments," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2005(2), pages 147-162.
    4. James Andreoni & Laura K. Gee, 2011. "The Hired Gun Mechanism," NBER Working Papers 17032, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Jakub Steiner, 2006. "Strong Enforcement by a Weak Authority," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 149, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    6. Eckel, Catherine & Gintis, Herbert, 2010. "Blaming the messenger: Notes on the current state of experimental economics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 109-119, January.
    7. Binmore, Ken & Shaked, Avner, 2010. "Experimental economics: Where next?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 87-100, January.
    8. Andreoni, James & Gee, Laura K., 2012. "Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(11), pages 1036-1046.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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