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Dominant Strategies Implementation of the Critical Path Allocation in the Project Planning Problem

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Abstract

In this paper we propose to analyze the economic problem of allocating tasks on time in order to finish a complex project when information about tasks' duration and predating sequences of tasks is privately owned by the agents that undertake each task. In order to achieve the efficient allocation of tasks -using the well-known Critical path method in the Operations Research literature-, the planner must design the appropriate incentives and compensations to the agents based on the reported information. We show the existence of mechanisms that implement in dominant strategies the efficient allocation of tasks on time. When we further add new desirable properties like individual rationality, an impossibility result emerges.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Perote Peña, 2003. "Dominant Strategies Implementation of the Critical Path Allocation in the Project Planning Problem," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/07, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
    • Handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2003_07
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    1. Theodore Groves, 1979. "Efficient Collective Choice when Compensation is Possible," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 227-241.
    2. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
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    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General

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