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The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta

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  • Hsieh, Chang-Tai
  • Miguel, Edward
  • Ortega, Daniel
  • Rodriguez, Francisco

Abstract

In 2004, the Chávez regime in Venezuela distributed the list of several million voters whom had attempted to remove him from office throughout the government bureaucracy, allegedly to identify and punish these voters. We match the list of petition signers distributed by the government to household survey respondents to measure the economic effects of being identified as a Chavez political opponent. We find that voters who were identified as Chavez opponents experienced a 5 percent drop in earnings and a 1.5 percentage point drop in employment rates after the voter list was released. A back-of-the envelope calculation suggests that the loss aggregate TFP from the misallocation of workers across jobs was substantial, on the order of 3 percent of GDP.

Suggested Citation

  • Hsieh, Chang-Tai & Miguel, Edward & Ortega, Daniel & Rodriguez, Francisco, 2009. "The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series qt8dx9n9r7, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  • Handle: RePEc:cdl:ciders:qt8dx9n9r7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Flochel, Thomas & Straub, Stéphane, 2011. "Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay," TSE Working Papers 11-224, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Mar 2015.
    2. Gilles Saint‐Paul & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2016. "A Theory of Political Entrenchment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(593), pages 1238-1263, June.
    3. Maurer, Stephan E., 2015. "Voting behaviour and public employment in Nazi Germany," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 61021, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Muhammad Haseeb & Kate Vyborny, 2016. "Imposing institutions: Evidence from cash transfer reform in Pakistan," CSAE Working Paper Series 2016-36, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    5. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Straub, Stéphane & Flochel, Thomas, 2016. "Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay," World Development, Elsevier, pages 395-407.
    6. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 2012. "Some Properties of Autocoherent Models," CEPR Discussion Papers 8959, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. McGuirk,Eoin & Rajaram,Anand & Giugale,Marcelo, 2016. "The political economy of direct dividend transfers in resource-rich countries : a theoretical consideration," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7575, The World Bank.
    8. Martínez, Luis R., 2017. "Transnational insurgents: Evidence from Colombia's FARC at the border with Chávez's Venezuela," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, pages 138-153.
    9. Brian Knight & Ana Tribin, 2016. "The Limits of Propaganda: Evidence from Chavez's Venezuela," NBER Working Papers 22055, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Eva Meyersson Milgrom, 2010. "The Dispossessed: A Labor-Market Analysis of Extreme Political Violence," Discussion Papers 09-007, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    11. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Straub, Stéphane & Flochel, Thomas, 2016. "Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay," World Development, Elsevier, pages 395-407.
    12. Sam Asher & Paul Novosad, 2017. "Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, pages 229-273.
    13. Gonzalez, Naihobe & Oyelere, Ruth Uwaifo, 2011. "Are returns to education on the decline in Venezuela and does Mission Sucre have a role to play?," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, pages 1348-1369.
    14. Gonzalez, Naihobe & Oyelere, Ruth Uwaifo, 2011. "Are returns to education on the decline in Venezuela and does Mission Sucre have a role to play?," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, pages 1348-1369.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    political opposition; TFP; Venezuela;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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