Rationing Public Goods by Cooperation or Pecuniary Incentives: Evidence from the Spare-the-Air Program
Policy-makers have relied on non-coercive mechanisms to achieve socially optimal outcomes in a variety of contexts when prices fail to ration scarce resources. Amid heightened concern about environmental damage and climate change, public appeals for cooperation and pecuniary incentives are frequently used to achieve resource conservation and other prosocial behavior. Yet the relative effectiveness of these two instruments is poorly understood when pecuniary incentives are small. This paper examines the extent to which free transit fares and appeals for car trip avoidance reduce car pollution on smoggy days. Using data on freeway traffic volumes and transit ridership, public appeals for cooperation are shown to reduce car trips. The marginal effect of free transit fares, however, is to increase car trips. Public appeals are shown to increase carpooling but not transit ridership. Free fares increase transit ridership but not carpooling. These results suggest that free transit rides do not induce motorists to substitute to transit, but instead subsidize regular transit rides and additional trips. They support findings in the behavioral literature that extrinsic incentives can crowd-out altruism.
|Date of creation:||01 Jul 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (510) 642-3345
Fax: (510) 643-8911
Web page: http://www.escholarship.org/repec/are_ucb/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- A. E. Peck & O. C. Doering III, 1976. "Voluntarism and Price Response: Consumer Reaction to the Energy Shortage," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 287-292, Spring.
- Janssen, Maarten C. W. & Mendys-Kamphorst, Ewa, 2004. "The price of a price: on the crowding out and in of social norms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 377-395, November.
- Frey, Bruno S & Jegen, Reto, 2001. " Motivation Crowding Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 589-611, December.
- Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-58, December.
- Akerlof, George A & Dickens, William T, 1982. "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 307-19, June.
- Mayer, Lawrence S., 1978. "Estimating the effects of the onset of the energy crisis on residential energy demand," Resources and Energy, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 57-92, September.
- Ronald Cummings & Mary Beth Walker, 2000. "Measuring the effectiveness of voluntary emission reduction programmes," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(13), pages 1719-1726.
- Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2003. "Cluster-Sample Methods in Applied Econometrics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 133-138, May.
- Cutter, W. Bowman & Neidell, Matthew, 2009. "Voluntary information programs and environmental regulation: Evidence from 'Spare the Air'," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 253-265, November.
- Chen, Chao, 2003. "Freeway Performance Measurement System (PeMS)," Institute of Transportation Studies, Research Reports, Working Papers, Proceedings qt6j93p90t, Institute of Transportation Studies, UC Berkeley.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt5xs9r6t8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lisa Schiff)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.