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Grazing Fees versus Stewardship on Federal Lands

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  • Watts, Myles J
  • Shimshack, Jay P
  • LaFrance, Jeffrey T.

Abstract

Livestock grazing on public lands continues to be a source of intense conflict and debate. We analyze this problem using a dynamic game. Low grazing fees let ranchers capture more rent from grazing. This increases the incentive to comply with federally mandated regulations. Optimal grazing contracts therefore include grazing fees that are lower than competitive private rates. The optimal policy also includes random monitoring to prevent strategic learning by cheating ranchers and avoid wasteful efforts to disguise noncompliant behavior. Finally, an optimal policy includes a penalty for cheating beyond terminating the lease. This penalty must be large enough that the rancher who would profit the most from cheating experiences a negative expected net return.

Suggested Citation

  • Watts, Myles J & Shimshack, Jay P & LaFrance, Jeffrey T., 2006. "Grazing Fees versus Stewardship on Federal Lands," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt26b384t9, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt26b384t9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. LaFrance, Jeffrey T. & Barney, L. Dwayne, 1991. "The envelope theorem in dynamic optimization," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 355-385, April.
    3. Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-891, December.
    4. Jeffrey T. LaFrance & Myles J. Watts, 1995. "Public Grazing in the West and "Rangeland Reform '94"," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 77(3), pages 447-461.
    5. Srinivasan, T. N., 1973. "Tax evasion: A model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 339-346.
    6. George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Johnson, Ronald N. & Watts, Myles J., 1989. "Contractual stipulations, resource use, and interest groups: Implications from federal grazing contracts," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 87-96, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. J. Shannon Neibergs & Tipton D. Hudson & Chad E. Kruger & Kaelin Hamel-Rieken, 2018. "Estimating climate change effects on grazing management and beef cattle production in the Pacific Northwest," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 5-17, January.

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