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Public Grazing in the West and "Rangeland Reform '94"

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  • Jeffrey T. LaFrance
  • Myles J. Watts

Abstract

Private grazing fees differ substantially and systematically across states in the West. In contrast, federal policy establishes the same grazing fee on federal lands, regardless of location. We analyze locational differences in private grazing fees with an econometric model. Differences in private grazing fees across states can be explained largely by economic forces consistent with a competitive spatial market. A uniform increase in the federal grazing fee will lead to a large variation in economic effects between states and across individual public lands ranchers. We propose the permanent transfer of public grazing rights to the private sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey T. LaFrance & Myles J. Watts, 1995. "Public Grazing in the West and "Rangeland Reform '94"," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-46, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:mos:moswps:archive-46
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    File URL: http://faculty.ses.wsu.edu/LaFrance/reprints/LW-AJAE-1995.pdf
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    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/1243215
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Karagiannis, Giannis, 1999. "Proportional Profit Taxes And Resource Management Under Production Uncertainty," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 24(02), December.
    2. Link, Johanna & Graeff, Simone & Batchelor, William David & Claupein, Wilhelm, 2006. "Evaluating the economic and environmental impact of environmental compensation payment policy under uniform and variable-rate nitrogen management," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 91(1-2), pages 135-153, November.
    3. Watts, Myles J & Shimshack, Jay P & LaFrance, Jeffrey T., 2006. "Grazing Fees versus Stewardship on Federal Lands," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt26b384t9, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    4. McCluskey, Jill J. & Rausser, Gordon C., 1999. "Federal Grazing Reform And Avoidable Risk," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 24(01), July.
    5. Tigran Melkonyan & Michael H. Taylor, 2013. "Regulatory Policy Design for Agroecosystem Management on Public Rangelands," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 95(3), pages 606-627.
    6. Fleming, R. A. & Adams, R. M., 1997. "The Importance of Site-Specific Information in the Design of Policies to Control Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 347-358, July.
    7. Keith Wiebe & Abebayehu Tegene & Betsey Kuhn, 1997. "Managing Public And Private Land Through Partial Interests," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 15(2), pages 35-43, April.

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