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Le financement de la sécurisation du commerce international pour les pays en développement - une approche en termes de bien public mondial -

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  • Philippe DULBECCO

    (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International(CERDI))

  • Bertrand LAPORTE

    (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International(CERDI))

Abstract

The aim of this article is to identify the modalities of financing international trade security. Our analysis is more specifically oriented by the issue of financing the developing countries which must make a considerable effort to attain the required level, whereas the developed countries have already largely invested in trade security since the events of 11th September 2001. We first characterise security in the context of a global public good, before studying the financing conditions and the discriminating criteria of the supply of the global public good security. We then presents a critical analysis of the various possible sources and instruments for financing the global public good security and propose different financing scenarios, each one based on a specific allocation of responsibilities among the players in security. We conclude by considering the role of the international institutions as project managers of the financing and implementation of the security of international trade.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe DULBECCO & Bertrand LAPORTE, 2003. "Le financement de la sécurisation du commerce international pour les pays en développement - une approche en termes de bien public mondial -," Working Papers 200312, CERDI.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdi:wpaper:436
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