Welfare in the Nash Equilibrium in Export Taxes under Bertrand Duopoly
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- Roger Clarke & David R. Collie, 2008. "Welfare In The Nash Equilibrium In Export Taxes Under Bertrand Duopoly," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 183-189, April.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ghosh, Arghya & Saha, Souresh, 2015. "Price competition, technology licensing and strategic trade policy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 91-99.
- Lim, Seonyoung & Choi, Kangsik, 2014. "Strategic Subsidy Policies with Endogenous Choice of Competition Mode," MPRA Paper 59462, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Choi, Kangsik & Lee, Ki-Dong & Lim, Seonyoung, 2016.
"Strategic Trade Policies In International Rivalry When Competition Mode Is Endogenous,"
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics,
Hitotsubashi University, vol. 57(2), pages 223-241, December.
- Choi, Kangsik & Lee, Ki-Dong & Lim, Seonyoung, 2014. "Strategic Trade Policies in International Rivalry When Competition Mode is Endogenous," MPRA Paper 59725, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
KeywordsTrade Policy; Imperfect Competition; Oligopoly;
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-02-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-INT-2006-02-26 (International Trade)
- NEP-MIC-2006-02-26 (Microeconomics)
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