Price Reveal Auctions on the Internet
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Klemperer, P., 1999. "Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature," Economics Papers 1999-w12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
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Cited by:
- Gallice Andrea, 2016.
"Price Reveal Auctions,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 485-514, June.
- Andrea Gallice, 2012. "Price Reveal Auctions," Working papers 015, Department of Economics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino.
- Andrea Gallice, 2015. "Price Reveal Auctions," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 437, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Di Gaetano, Luigi, 2011. "A model of descending auction with hidden starting price and endogenous price decrease," MPRA Paper 35773, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Yumiko Baba, 2013. "A Note On Dutch Auctions With Time Credits," Working Papers e053, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
- Kim, Ju-Young & Brünner, Tobias & Skiera, Bernd & Natter, Martin, 2014. "A comparison of different pay-per-bid auction formats," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 368-379.
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More about this item
Keywords
price reveal auctions; pay-per-bid auctions;JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2010-08-06 (Contract Theory and Applications)
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