Benchmarking and Regulation of Electricity Transmission and Distribution Utilities: Lessons from International Experience
Since the early 1980’s, many countries have implemented electricity sector reform, many of which have bundled generation, transmission, distribution and supply activities, and have introduced competition in generation and supply. An increasing number of countries are also adopting incentive regulation to promote efficiency improvement in the natural monopoly activities - transmission and distribution. Incentive regulation almost invariably involves benchmarking or comparison of actual vs. some reference performance. This paper reviews the main approaches to incentive regulation and discusses various benchmarking methods. We also present the finding of a survey of the use of benchmarking methods in the OECD and few other countries. Our survey finds a variety of methods used by the electricity regulators although with a notable preference for the non-parametric methods. We then draw conclusions based on the finding of the survey highlighting the main outstanding issues and lessons for best practice implementation of benchmarking in electricity regulation.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Stern, Jon & Holder, Stuart, 1999. "Regulatory governance: criteria for assessing the performance of regulatory systems: An application to infrastructure industries in the developing countries of Asia," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 33-50, March.
- Rees, R. & Vickers, J., 1991. "RPI-X Price Cap Regulation," Working Papers 1992-01, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Berry, Dan Michael, 1994. "Private Ownership Form and Productive Efficiency: Electric Cooperatives versus Investor-Owned Utilities," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 399-420, December.
- Berg, Sanford V & Jeong, Jinook, 1991. "An Evaluation of Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 45-55, March.
- Weyman-Jones, Thomas G., 1991. "Productive efficiency in a regulated industry : The area electricity boards of England and Wales," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 116-122, April.
- Paul L. Joskow, 1998. "Electricity Sectors in Transition," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 25-52.
- Massimo Filippini, 1998. "Are Municipal Electricity Distribution Utilities Natural Monopolies?," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(2), pages 157-174, June.
- John Vickers & George Yarrow, 1988. "Privatization: An Economic Analysis," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262720116, January.
- Ali Emami Meibodi, 1998. "Efficiency Considerations in the Electricity Supply Industry; The Case of Iran," Surrey Energy Economics Centre (SEEC), School of Economics Discussion Papers (SEEDS) 95, Surrey Energy Economics Centre (SEEC), School of Economics, University of Surrey.
- Burns, Philip & Weyman-Jones, Thomas G, 1996. "Cost Functions and Cost Efficiency in Electricity Distribution: A Stochastic Frontier Approach," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1), pages 41-64, January.
- Paul L. Joskow, 2006. "Incentive Regulation for Electricity Networks," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 4(2), pages 3-9, 07.
- Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790, January.
- John Whiteman, 1999. "The Potential Benefits of Hilmer and Related Reforms: Electricity Supply," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 32(1), pages 17-30.
- Førsund, Finn R. & Kittelsen, Sverre A. C., 1998. "Productivity development of Norwegian electricity distribution utilities," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 207-224, September.
- Goto, Mika & Tsutsui, Miki, 1998. "Comparison of Productive and Cost Efficiencies Among Japanese and US Electric Utilities," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 177-194, April.
- Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-246, October.
- Kumbhakar, Subal C. & Hjalmarsson, Lennart, 1998. "Relative performance of public and private ownership under yardstick competition: electricity retail distribution," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 97-122, January.
- Crew, Michael A & Kleindorfer, Paul R, 1996. "Incentive Regulation in the United Kingdom and the United States: Some Lessons," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 211-225, May.
- Sawkins, John W., 1995. "Yardstick competition in the English and Welsh water industry Fiction or reality?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 27-36, January.
- Yunos, Jamaluddin Mohd & Hawdon, David, 1997. "The efficiency of the National Electricity Board in Malaysia: An intercountry comparison using DEA," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 255-269, May.
- Bagdadioglu, Necmiddin & Waddams Price, Catherine M. & Weyman-Jones, Thomas G., 1996. "Efficiency and ownership in electricity distribution: A non-parametric model of the Turkish experience," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 1-23, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0101. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jake Dyer)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.