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Can A Less Boring ECB Remain Accountable?

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  • Jean Pisani-Ferry
  • Jakob von Weizsäcker

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Jean Pisani-Ferry & Jakob von Weizsäcker, 2009. "Can A Less Boring ECB Remain Accountable?," Bruegel Policy Contributions 326, Bruegel.
    • Handle: RePEc:bre:polcon:326
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    File URL: https://www.bruegel.org/system/files/wp_attachments/pc_centralbanks_300909.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Geraats, Petra M., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-21, March.
    2. Benassy-Quere, Agnes & Coeure, Benoit & Jacquet, Pierre & Pisani-Ferry, Jean, 2010. "Economic Policy: Theory and Practice," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195322736.
    3. Crowe, Christopher & Meade, Ellen E., 2008. "Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 763-777, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Guntram B. Wolff, 2011. "The Euro area's macroeconomic balancing act," Bruegel Policy Contributions 555, Bruegel.

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