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Leadership communication and COVID-19 vaccination hesitancy

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  • Phil-Adrian Klotz

    (Justus-Liebig-University Giessen)

Abstract

This presentation empirically analyzes the impact of leadership communication on the COVID-19 vaccination rate using a quasiexperimental design. Based on a speech by the president of France, Emmanuel Macron, I examine how political leaders can influence the willingness of a country’s citizens to get vaccinated by transmitting scientific insights into a clear and vivid message as well as by threatening unvaccinated people with future restrictions. In a difference-in-differences (DiD) framework, it is shown that a televised address of Macron increased the vaccination rate in France by roughly 5%. I test the robustness of this result by applying an event-study design. My findings imply that leadership communication is an effective weapon to change the beliefs of unvaccinated citizens and to overcome COVID-19 vaccination hesitancy.

Suggested Citation

  • Phil-Adrian Klotz, 2022. "Leadership communication and COVID-19 vaccination hesitancy," French Stata Users' Group Meetings 2022 26, Stata Users Group.
  • Handle: RePEc:boc:fsug22:26
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    References listed on IDEAS

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