Moral Compliance and the Concealed Charm of Prudence
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References listed on IDEAS
- Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000.
"Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, "undated". "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers 010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series 183, CESifo Group Munich.
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Keywordscompliance; incentive compatible; moral policy; prudence; rationality; A13;
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
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