The dynamics of closeness and betweenness
Although both betweenness and closeness centrality are claimed to be important for the effectiveness of someone's network position, it has not been explicitly studied which networks emerge if actors follow incentives for these two positional advantages. We propose such a model and observe that network dynamics differ considerably in a scenario with either betweenness or closeness incentives compared to a scenario in which closeness and betweenness incentives are combined. Considering social consequences, we find low clustering when actors strive for either type of centrality. Surprisingly, actors striving for closeness are likely to reach networks with relatively low closeness and high betweenness, while this is the other way round for actors striving for betweenness. This shows that in both situations the network formation process implies a social dilemma in which the social optimum is not reached by individual optimizing.
|Date of creation:||15 Aug 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Postfach 10 01 31, 33501 Bielefeld|
Web page: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996.
"A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1994. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1995. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Buechel, Berno, 2011. "Network formation with closeness incentives," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 395, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
- Dekker, D.J. & Franses, Ph.H.B.F. & Krackhardt, D., 2001. "An Equilibrium-Correction Model for Dynamic Network Data," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2001-39-MKT, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
- Goyal, Sanjeev & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2007. "Structural holes in social networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 460-492, November.
- Gert Sabidussi, 1966. "The centrality index of a graph," Psychometrika, Springer;The Psychometric Society, vol. 31(4), pages 581-603, December.
- Sanjeev Goyal & Sumit Joshi, 2006. "Unequal connections," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(3), pages 319-349, October.
- Galeotti, Andrea & Goyal, Sanjeev & Kamphorst, Jurjen, 2003.
"Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players,"
Economics Discussion Papers
2996, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- K. de Jaegher & J.J.A. Kamphorst, 2008. "Network formation with decreasing marginal benefits of information," Working Papers 08-16, Utrecht School of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:398. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bettina Weingarten)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.