Experimental Evidence for Attractions to Chance
Divide the decisionmaker's future into: (i) a pre-outcome period (lasting from the decision until the outcome of that decision is known), and (ii) a sequel post-outcome period (beginning when the outcome becomes known). Anticipated emotions in both periods may influence the decision, in particular, with regard to an outcome that matters to the person, the enjoyable tension from not yet knowing what this outcome will be. In the experiments presented, lottery choice can be explained by this attraction to chance, and cannot be explained by either convex von Neumann^Morgenstern utility, or by rank dependent risk loving weights: attraction to chance is a separate motivator.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||Dec 1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robin Cubitt & Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden, 1998. "On the Validity of the Random Lottery Incentive System," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 115-131, September.
- Quiggin, John, 1982. "A theory of anticipated utility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 323-343, December.
- Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1992. " Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 297-323, October.
- Pope, Robin, 1999. "Reconciliation with the Utility of Chance by Elaborated Outcomes Destroys the Axiomatic Basis of Expected Utility Theory," Discussion Paper Serie B 449, University of Bonn, Germany.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:317. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dr. Frederik Herzberg)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.