IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bgu/wpaper/1903.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Pay Secrecy In Labor Markets With Matching Frictions

Author

Listed:
  • Tomer Blumkin

    (BGU)

  • David Lagziel

    (BGU)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Tomer Blumkin & David Lagziel, 2019. "Pay Secrecy In Labor Markets With Matching Frictions," Working Papers 1903, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1903
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1903.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Zoë Cullen & Ricardo Perez-Truglia, 2022. "How Much Does Your Boss Make? The Effects of Salary Comparisons," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(3), pages 766-822.
    2. David Card & Alexandre Mas & Enrico Moretti & Emmanuel Saez, 2012. "Inequality at Work: The Effect of Peer Salaries on Job Satisfaction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2981-3003, October.
    3. Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June.
    4. Lippman, Steven A & McCall, John J, 1976. "The Economics of Job Search: A Survey," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(3), pages 347-368, September.
    5. Danziger, Leif & Katz, Eliakim, 1997. "Wage Secrecy as a Social Convention," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(1), pages 59-69, January.
    6. Tomer Blumkin & David Lagziel, 2019. "Relative Ambition And The Role Of Wage Secrecy In Labor Contracts," Working Papers 1902, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    7. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tomer Blumkin & David Lagziel, 2019. "Relative Ambition And The Role Of Wage Secrecy In Labor Contracts," Working Papers 1902, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tomer Blumkin & David Lagziel, 2019. "Relative Ambition And The Role Of Wage Secrecy In Labor Contracts," Working Papers 1902, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    2. Cullen, Zoë & Perez-Truglia, Ricardo, 2023. "The salary taboo privacy norms and the diffusion of information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    3. Xiaogeng Xu & Satu Metsälampi & Michael Kirchler & Kaisa Kotakorpi & Peter Hans Matthews & Topi Miettinen, 2023. "Which income comparisons matter to people, and how? Evidence from a large field experiment," Working Papers 10, Finnish Centre of Excellence in Tax Systems Research.
    4. Armstrong, Mark & Zhou, Jidong, 2010. "Exploding offers and buy-now discounts," MPRA Paper 22531, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Jäger, Simon & Roth, Christopher & Roussille, Nina & Schoefer, Benjamin, 2021. "Worker Beliefs about Outside Options," IZA Discussion Papers 14963, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Ingar Haaland & Christopher Roth & Johannes Wohlfart, 2023. "Designing Information Provision Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 3-40, March.
    7. Bennedsen, Morten & Larsen, Birthe & Wei, Jiayi, 2022. "Wage Transparency and the Gender Pay Gap: A Survey," Working Papers 17-2022, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
    8. Michael Baker & Yosh Halberstam & Kory Kroft & Alexandre Mas & Derek Messacar, 2023. "Pay Transparency and the Gender Gap," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 157-183, April.
    9. Hämäläinen, Saara, 2018. "Competitive search obfuscation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 38-63.
    10. Diaz, Lina & Houser, Daniel & Ifcher, John & Zarghamee, Homa, 2023. "Estimating social preferences using stated satisfaction: Novel support for inequity aversion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
    11. Sneha Bakshi, 2020. "Limits of price competition: cost asymmetry and imperfect information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(4), pages 913-932, December.
    12. Bruce I. Carlin & Florian Ederer, 2019. "Search Fatigue," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(3), pages 485-508, May.
    13. Rafael P. Greminger, 2022. "Optimal Search and Discovery," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(5), pages 3904-3924, May.
    14. C. Monica Capra & Jacob K Goeree & Rosario Gomez & Charles A Holt, 2002. "Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(3), pages 613-636, August.
    15. Esther Gal-Or & Mordechai Gal-Or & Anthony Dukes, 2007. "Optimal information revelation in procurement schemes," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 400-418, June.
    16. Simon P. Anderson & Régis Renault & Claude Jessua, 1996. "Produits différenciés et information imparfaite des consommateurs," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(3), pages 425-435.
    17. Demir, Gökay, 2022. "Labor market frictions and spillover effects from publicly announced sectoral minimum wages," Ruhr Economic Papers 985, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    18. Srikant Devaraj & Pankaj C. Patel, 2022. "State bans on pay secrecy and earnings: Evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 60(4), pages 697-734, December.
    19. Werner, Peter, 2023. "Wage negotiations and strategic responses to transparency," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 209(C), pages 161-175.
    20. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nicolas Drouhin, 2010. "The end of the Bertrand Paradox ?," Post-Print halshs-00542486, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    secrecy; wage signaling; matching friction; tacit collusion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1903. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Aamer Abu-Qarn (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/edbguil.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.