Aversion to Inequality and Segregating Equilibria
This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals depend not only on their allocations, but also on the well-being of other persons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study the allocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. We show that even small deviations from purely "selfish" preferences leads to widespread workplace skill segregation. That is, workers of different abilities tend to work in different firms, as long as they care somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are "close".
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- Pedro Rey-Biel, 2008.
"Inequity Aversion and Team Incentives,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 110(2), pages 297-320, 06.
- Pedro Rey-Biel, "undated". "Inequity Aversion and Team Incentives," Working Papers 319, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Pedro Rey-Biel, 2007. "Inequity Version and Team Incentives," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 677.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Pedro Rey Biel, 2004. "Inequity aversion and team incentives," Microeconomics 0407009, EconWPA.
- Kremer, M & Maskin, E, 1996. "Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill," Working papers 96-23, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Michael Kremer & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill," NBER Working Papers 5718, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
- Antonio Cabrales & Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Nicola Pavoni, 2008. "Social Preferences, Skill Segregation, and Wage Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 65-98.
- Antonio Cabrales & Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Nicola Pavoni, 2004. "Social Preferences, Skill Segregation and Wage Dynamics," Working Papers 181, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Antonio Cabrales & Antoni Calvo-Armengol & Nicola Pavoni, 2005. "Social Preferences, Skill Segregation, and Wage Dynamics," 2005 Meeting Papers 205, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Cabrales Goitia Antonio & Calvó-Armengol Antoni & Pavoni Nicola, 2007. "Social Preferences, Skill Segregation and Wage Dynamics," Working Papers 201053, Fundacion BBVA / BBVA Foundation.
- Fershtman, C. & Weiss, Y. & Hvide, H.K., 2001. "Status Concerns and the Organization of Work," Papers 2001-2, Tel Aviv.
- Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
- de Bartolome, Charles A M, 1990. "Equilibrium and Inefficiency in a Community Model with Peer Group Effects," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 110-133, February. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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