Aversion to Inequality and Segregating Equilibria
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- Pedro Rey-Biel, 2008.
"Inequity Aversion and Team Incentives,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 110(2), pages 297-320, June.
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More about this item
KeywordsContract theory; Mechanism Design; envy; social preferences; skill segregation;
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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