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Anreizregulierung bei Stromverteilnetzen: Effizienz versus Investitionen

Author

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  • Gert Brunekreeft
  • Roland Meyer

Abstract

In Deutschland wird derzeit die Ausgestaltung der Anreizregulierungsverordnung für Energienetze für die dritte Regulierungsperiode (ab 2019) diskutiert. Im Kern steht der sachgerechte Umgang mit dem hohen Investitionsbedarf, vor dem viele Netzbetreiber stehen. Die preisbasierte Anreizregulierung im eigentlichen Sinne zielt primär auf Kosteneffizienz, während das Ziel der Investitionsanreize in den Hintergrund rückt. Umgekehrt ist es bei kostenbasierter Regulierung. Jetzt stellt sich die Frage, wie die beiden Ziele „Effizienz“ und „Investitionen“ gleichermaßen erreicht werden können. Dieser Aufsatz beschreibt die Kernargumente und zeigt auf, wie die Anreizregulierung in der Praxis investitionsfördernde Komponenten berücksichtigt.

Suggested Citation

  • Gert Brunekreeft & Roland Meyer, 2015. "Anreizregulierung bei Stromverteilnetzen: Effizienz versus Investitionen," Bremen Energy Working Papers 0021, Bremen Energy Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:bei:00bewp:0021
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gert Brunekreeft & Marius Buchmann & Toru Hattori & Roland Meyer, 2016. "Evaluation of Strategy of Power Generation Business under Large-Scale Integration of Renewable Energy," Bremen Energy Working Papers 0023, Bremen Energy Research.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Netzinfrastruktur; Energie; Monopol; Regulierung; Investitionen;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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