Requested, Executed and Recoverable Credit: Shared Action Ordering among LLM Borrowers in a Simulated Lending Market

We test whether shared action ordering changes executed credit in a simulated collateralized lending market. Three small open-weight language models face a borrowing cap that values collateral at the pool price; only two of the three model families traded. A validation campaign, hash-locked locally before its first model call, pairs 12 common-order markets with 12 balanced-order markets under a revised interface. An exact randomization test rejects the sharp null that common-market net debt is invariant to complete-order assignment (two-sided p = 2/8,100). The pre-specified estimate of the lever-up-first versus delever-first common-market contrast is 1.12 units of initial unused reference borrowing capacity, combining a 0.828 gap between the two groups of common markets with a 0.293 balanced-baseline component. All 24 markets increased debt. An exploratory accounting split shows that lever-up-first common markets borrowed more and repaid less. With requests held fixed, reference-priced collateral narrows the observed common-market order gap from 0.828 to 0.688 capacity units. No market experienced liquidation or realized bad debt. Under the pre-specified fixed-price 30 percent shock benchmark, individual high-LTV loans generate scenario write-offs even though aggregate LTVs remain below the write-off threshold. Most benchmark write-off arises from collateral consumed by the liquidation bonus. The experiment establishes an effect of action order on executed credit; accounting identities and deterministic counterfactuals explain how collateral constraints and borrower-level debt allocation shape conditional creditor recovery.