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Ownership Networks and Economic Power in the Italian Energy Sector

Author

Listed:
  • Andrea Pannone
  • Francesco Giancaterini
  • Tiziano Bacaloni
  • Andrea Bernardini
  • Alessio Abeltino

Abstract

The energy sector is a cornerstone of national strategic autonomy, yet its increasing financialization has transformed ownership structures into complex networked configurations. This paper investigates the distribution of economic power in the Italian energy sector by introducing two sector-level extensions of the Network Power framework: the Aggregate Network Power Index (A-NPI) and the Aggregate Network Power Flow (A-NPF). Unlike traditional macro-level measures, these indices aggregate firm-level control and influence into a systemic framework that accounts for the relative economic weight of each operator. Applying this framework to the Italian case reveals a "Governance Paradox": while the State retains formal majority ownership, the sector's deepening reliance on global capital markets and the pervasive presence of common ownership by transnational institutional investors have progressively hollowed out public strategic direction. The results show that capital centralization enables global financial actors to internalize sectoral competition, fostering a regime of tacit strategic convergence in the management of critical infrastructure. This configuration challenges European strategic autonomy, raising questions about the adequacy of traditional Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) screening and antitrust tools in addressing the systemic influence exerted through networked ownership structures.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Pannone & Francesco Giancaterini & Tiziano Bacaloni & Andrea Bernardini & Alessio Abeltino, 2026. "Ownership Networks and Economic Power in the Italian Energy Sector," Papers 2605.25555, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2605.25555
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    References listed on IDEAS

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