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The flow of corporate control in the global ownership network

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  • Takayuki Mizuno
  • Shohei Doi
  • Shuhei Kurizaki

Abstract

We propose a model and algorithm to measure the amount of influence a shareholder has over the flow of corporate control held by the ultimate owners. Existing models of corporate ownership and control either focus on the ultimate owners’ influence or inadequately evaluate the influence possessed by intermediate shareholders in a ownership network. As it extends Network Power Index (NPI) that describes the the power of corporate control possessed by the ultimate owners, our new model, Network Power Flow (NPF), delineates the distribution of ownership influence among shareholders across the network and identifies the channels through which the ultimate owners’ corporate control travel through the global shareholding network. Our analysis of NPI and NPF values for 7 million ultimate owners and 16 million shareholders reveals a new landscape of ownership and control in the global shareholding network that remained opaque before.

Suggested Citation

  • Takayuki Mizuno & Shohei Doi & Shuhei Kurizaki, 2023. "The flow of corporate control in the global ownership network," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 18(8), pages 1-22, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0290229
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0290229
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    References listed on IDEAS

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