IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

On Food Companies Liability for Obesity

  • Bénédicte Coestier
  • Estelle Gozlan
  • Stephan Marette

The US food industry faces tobacco-style lawsuits for providing misleading information about health risks linked to the consumption of fatty products. This paper investigates the link between alternative liability rules and the incentive for disclosing health information to consumers. We show that if the expected damage is relatively low, the absence of intervention is socially optimal. If the expected damage is not too high, mandatory labeling is socially optimal. Liability rules are only welfare-enhancing for high levels of risk and/or when consumers misperceive health warnings.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by INRA, Economie Publique in its series Working Papers with number 2004/01.

in new window

Date of creation: 01 Jun 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:apu:wpaper:2004/01
Contact details of provider: Postal: BP 01, 78850 Thiverval Grignon
Phone: 01 30 81 53 30
Fax: 01 30 81 53 68
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Elamin H. Elbasha* & T. Lynn Riggs, 2003. "The effects of information on producer and consumer incentives to undertake food safety efforts: A theoretical model and policy implications," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(1), pages 29-42.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:apu:wpaper:2004/01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Régis Grateau)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.