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Giving To Ingrates?


  • Michael Jones
  • Michael McKee


Models for voluntary provision of public goods predict free riding is rational unless the model includes a motive for the act of giving referred to as a “warm glow” in the literature. The source for this warm glow is likely to include the gratitude of the recipient. The experimental setting employed here controls for positive or negative reciprocity from the recipient of a gift to isolate the individual satisfaction from the act of giving as the remaining motivation for giving. The experimental treatment is whether the recipient is informed that his/her payoff includes a “gift” from another participant (donor or giver). The central finding is that donations increase when the donor/giver knows that the recipient knows that a gift has been provided. Key Words:

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  • Michael Jones & Michael McKee, 2008. "Giving To Ingrates?," Working Papers 08-06, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
  • Handle: RePEc:apl:wpaper:08-06

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Dirk Engelmann & Martin Strobel, 2004. "Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 857-869, September.
    2. Andreoni, James A & Miller, John H, 1993. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(418), pages 570-585, May.
    3. Glenn W Harrison & Laurie T Johnson, 2004. "Identifying Altruism in the Laboratory," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000176, David K. Levine.
    4. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2006. "Economics, Gratitude, and Warm Glow," Working Papers 0601, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    5. Forsythe Robert & Horowitz Joel L. & Savin N. E. & Sefton Martin, 1994. "Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 347-369, May.
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