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Determinants Of Judicial Efficiency Change: Evidence From Brazil

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  • THIAGO DE ARAÚJO FAUVRELLE
  • ALÉSSIO TONY CAVALCANTI DE ALMEIDA

Abstract

Judicial efficiency matters for economic development. Nevertheless, the determinants of judicial productivity growth are not entirely understood. Using data of Brazil's state courts for the period of 2009 to 2014, this paper analyzes judicial productivity change and its possible determinants over time in a two stage approach. First, data envelopment analysis is used to calculate Malmquist productivity measures which are decomposed in: technical change (frontier-shift effect) and efficiency change (composed of pure efficiency change and scale efficiency change). In the second stage, fixed effect models are estimated to evaluate the associated factors with judicial productivity growth. The first stage results show a slight improvement in judicial productivity trend, which is defined mainly by efficiency change, since technical change deteriorated in the period. The second stage findings suggest the nonexistence of a trade-off between judicial quality and efficiency improvement. Moreover, judges’ remuneration, legal complexity and technological use are correlated with judicial productivity, however not always in the expected direction.
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  • Thiago De Araújo Fauvrelle & Aléssio Tony Cavalcanti De Almeida, 2018. "Determinants Of Judicial Efficiency Change: Evidence From Brazil," Anais do XLIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 44th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 79, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
  • Handle: RePEc:anp:en2016:79
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    Cited by:

    1. Caio Castelliano & Peter Grajzl & Tomas Aquino Guimaraes & Andre Alves, 2021. "Judicial enforcement and caseload: theory and evidence from Brazil," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 137-168, August.
    2. Pontus Mattsson & Jonas Månsson & Christian Andersson & Fredrik Bonander, 2018. "A bootstrapped Malmquist index applied to Swedish district courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 109-139, August.
    3. Francesco Aiello & Graziella Bonanno & Francesco Foglia, 2021. "On The Heterogeneity In The Judicial Efficiency Literature: A Meta-Regression Analysis," Working Papers 202102, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF.

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    JEL classification:

    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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