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Courts in a Transition Economy: Case Disposition and the Quantity-Quality Tradeoff in Bulgaria

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  • VALENTINA DIMITROVA-GRAJZL
  • PETER GRAJZL
  • ATANAS SLAVOV
  • KATARINA ZAJC

Abstract

The lack of effective judiciary in post-socialist countries has been a pervasive concern and successful judicial reform an elusive goal. Yet to date, little empirical research exists on the functioning of courts in the post-socialist world. We draw on a new court-level panel dataset from Bulgaria to study the determinants of court case disposition and to evaluate whether judicial decision-making is subject to a quantity-quality tradeoff. Addressing endogeneity concerns, we find that case disposition in Bulgarian courts is largely driven by demand for court services. The number of serving judges, a key court resource, matters to a limited extent only in a subsample of courts, a result suggesting that judges adjust their productivity based on the number of judges serving at a court. We do not find evidence implying that increasing court productivity would decrease adjudicatory quality. We discuss the policy implications of our findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Valentina Dimitrova-Grajzl & Peter Grajzl & Atanas Slavov & Katarina Zajc, 2015. "Courts in a Transition Economy: Case Disposition and the Quantity-Quality Tradeoff in Bulgaria," Working papers of the Department of Economics - University of Perugia (IT) 0007/2015, Università di Perugia, Dipartimento Economia.
  • Handle: RePEc:pia:papers:0007/2015
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    JEL classification:

    • P37 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact

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