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Access to Justice and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from Brazil's Special Civil Tribunals

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  • Guilherme Lichand
  • Rodrigo R. Soares

Abstract

Entrepreneurship is usually identified as an important determinant of aggregate productivity and long-term growth. The determinants of entrepreneurship, nevertheless, are not entirely understood. A recent literature has linked entrepreneurship to the development of the justice system. This paper contributes to this literature by evaluating the role of access to justice in determining the incidence of entrepreneurship. We explore the creation of special civil tribunals in the Brazilian state of São Paulo during the 1990s. Special civil tribunals increased the geographic presence of the justice system, simplified judicial procedures, and increased the speed of adjudication of disputes. Using census data and an instrumental variables strategy, we find that implementation of special civil tribunals led to increased entrepreneurship among individuals with higher levels of education. Results do not seem to be related either to other changes in public goods provision at the local level or to preexisting trends.

Suggested Citation

  • Guilherme Lichand & Rodrigo R. Soares, 2014. "Access to Justice and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from Brazil's Special Civil Tribunals," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(2), pages 459-499.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/675087
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Emanuela Carbonara & Enrico Santarelli & Hien Thu Tran, 2016. "De jure determinants of new firm formation: how the pillars of constitutions influence entrepreneurship," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 139-162, June.
    2. Miguel García-Posada & Juan Mora-Sanguinetti, 2015. "Entrepreneurship and enforcement institutions: disaggregated evidence for Spain," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 49-74, August.
    3. Florence Kondylis & Mattea Stein, 2018. "The Speed of Justice," PSE Working Papers halshs-01735025, HAL.
    4. Roberto Ippoliti, 2015. "La riforma della geografia giudiziaria: efficienza tecnica e domanda di giustizia," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2015(2), pages 91-124.
    5. Thiago De Araújo Fauvrelle & Aléssio Tony Cavalcanti De Almeida, 2018. "Determinants Of Judicial Efficiency Change: Evidence From Brazil," Anais do XLIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 44th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 79, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    6. Miguel García-Posada & Juan Mora-Sanguinetti, 2015. "Does (average) size matter? Court enforcement, business demography and firm growth," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 639-669, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • O54 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Latin America; Caribbean

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