The Web's Promotional Effect and Artists' Strategies
The paper explores one of the new business models of the music market proposed by Varian (2005): the importance of the promotional effect of web-based diffusion. An indirect form of such investment consists in non-opposition by artists against the circulation of their music files online, or, likewise, their choice of permitting free downloads of their music albums. The profits lost from legal sales - online or on traditional supports - may be off-set by promotional advantages deriving from greater diffusion, with an increase in the artist's market share. The model assumes the existence of a strong network effect and an exchange of information, opinions and contents among web users. The model's results are determined by the initial conditions, i.e. by an artist's market share at an initial instant of time: or in other words, by his/her popularity. It is shown that emerging artists should make maximum investment in promotion, so that the diffusion of their work can be driven by the network effect and they can emerge from anonymity. Instead, for well-established artists, whose market shares are already large, the optimal strategy is to make the least promotional effort, given that the spontaneous diffusion of their work is already high.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +39 071 220 7100
Fax: +39 071 220 7102
Web page: http://www.dises.univpm.it/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2004.
"The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond,"
NBER Working Papers
10956, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2005. "The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 99-120, Spring.
- Paul Belleflamme & Pierre M. Picard, 2007.
"Piracy and Competition,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 351-383, 06.
- Paul, BELLEFLAMME & Pierre, PICARD, 2005. "Piracy and competition," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005057, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- BELLEFLAMME, Paul & PICARD, Pierre, 2005. "Piracy and competition," CORE Discussion Papers 2005083, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Paul Belleflamme & Pierre M. Picard, 2004. "Piracy and Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 1350, CESifo Group Munich.
- Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David, 2002.
"The Case Against Intellectual Property,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3273, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rick Harbaugh & Rahul Khemka, . "Does Copyright Enforcement Encourage Piracy?," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2000-14, Claremont Colleges.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:anc:wpaper:345. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Maurizio Mariotti)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.