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The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Public Versus Private Management

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  • Bayer, Patrick
  • Pozen, David E.

Abstract

This paper uses data on juvenile offenders released from correctional facilities in Florida to explore the effects of facility management type (private for-profit, private nonprofit, public state-operated, and public county-operated) on recidivism outcomes and costs. The data provide detailed information on individual characteristics, criminal and correctional histories, judge-assigned restrictiveness levels, and home zipcodes allowing us to control for the non-random assignment of individuals to facilities far better than any previous study. Relative to all other management types, for-profit management leads to a statistically significant increase in recidivism, but, relative to nonprofit and state-operated facilities, for-profit facilities operate at a lower cost to the government per comparable individual released. Cost-benefit analysis implies that the short-run savings offered by for-profit over nonprofit management are negated in the long run due to increased recidivism rates, even if one measures the benefits of reducing criminal activity as only the avoided costs of additional confinement.

Suggested Citation

  • Bayer, Patrick & Pozen, David E., 2003. "The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Public Versus Private Management," Center Discussion Papers 28484, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:yaleeg:28484
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.28484
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    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/28484/files/dp030863.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Anderson, David A, 1999. "The Aggregate Burden of Crime," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 611-642, October.
    2. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-1161.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bayer, Patrick & Pozen, David E, 2005. "The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Public versus Private Management," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 549-589, October.

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