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Explaining market behavior of farmers - Findings from an experimental beauty contest game with different contexts

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  • Hohler, J.
  • Muller, J.
  • Kuhl, R.

Abstract

The supply in a market can be interpreted as a result of expectations of market participants about the behavior of other market participants and about the demand. Thus, a production decision has the character of a beauty contest problem. In addition, society s expectations may play a role in the production decision. We want to examine the decision-making behavior of farmers in three different, realistic scenarios: fungicide use, wheat production, and production of animal welfare-friendly meat. With an incentive-compatible beauty contest experiment, we show if and how farmers consider the behavior of other farmers in their own decisions. In addition, in an initial exploratory analysis, we examine the impact of different contexts and influencing factors on decision-making behavior. Initial results show that farmers take into account the behavior of other farmers, but seemingly misinterpret the other participants impact on their own outcome. Acknowledgement :

Suggested Citation

  • Hohler, J. & Muller, J. & Kuhl, R., 2018. "Explaining market behavior of farmers - Findings from an experimental beauty contest game with different contexts," 2018 Conference, July 28-August 2, 2018, Vancouver, British Columbia 277121, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:iaae18:277121
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.277121
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    References listed on IDEAS

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