Tendering conservation contracts: Should information on environmental benefits be disclosed or concealed?
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|Date of creation:||2011|
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- Ruben N. Lubowski & Michael J. Roberts, 2005. "How Cost-Effective Are Land Retirement Auctions? Estimating the Difference between Payments and Willingness to Accept in the Conservation Reserve Program," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 87(5), pages 1239-1247.
- Uwe Latacz-Lohmann & Carel Van der Hamsvoort, 1997. "Auctioning Conservation Contracts: A Theoretical Analysis and an Application," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 79(2), pages 407-418.
- Rolfe, John & Windle, Jill, 2006. "Using Field Experiments to Explore the Use of Multiple Bidding Rounds in Conservation Auctions," Discussion Papers 25801, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Connor, Jeffery D. & Ward, John R. & Bryan, Brett, 2008. "Exploring the cost effectiveness of land conservation auctions and payment policies," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 52(3), September.
- Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata & Duke, Charlotte, 2002.
"A Laboratory Study of Auctions for Reducing Non-Point Source Pollution,"
2002 Conference (46th), February 13-15, 2002, Canberra
174066, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
- Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata & Duke, Charlotte, 2003. "A laboratory study of auctions for reducing non-point source pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 446-471, November.
- Wiebe, Keith D. & Gollehon, Noel R., 2006. "Agricultural Resources and Environmental Indicators, 2006 Edition," Economic Information Bulletin 7207, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
- Jeffery D. Connor & John R. Ward & Brett Bryan, 2008. "Exploring the cost effectiveness of land conservation auctions and payment policies ," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 52(3), pages 303-319, 09.
- Mark Eigenraam & Loris Strappazzon & Nicola Lansdell & Craig Beverly & Gary Stoneham, 2007. "Designing frameworks to deliver unknown information to support market-based instruments," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 37(s1), pages 261-269, December.
- Iain M. Fraser, 1995. "An Analysis Of Management Agreement Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 20-32.
- Uwe Latacz-Lohmann & Steven Schilizzi, 2007. "Quantifying the Benefits of Conservation Auctions," EuroChoices, The Agricultural Economics Society, vol. 6(3), pages 32-39, December.
- Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan, 2004. "Auction Design for Voluntary Conservation Programs," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1211-1217.
- Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe & Schilizzi, Steven, 2007. "Quantifying The Benefits Of Conservation Auctions: Evidence From An Economic Experiment," 47th Annual Conference, Weihenstephan, Germany, September 26-28, 2007 7616, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA).
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