Quantifying The Benefits Of Conservation Auctions: Evidence From An Economic Experiment
Building on available theory, this work uses controlled laboratory experiments to investigate the budgetary and the economic performance of competitive tenders for allocating conservation contracts to landholders. Experiments have been replicated in two different countries to check for robustness of results. We find that auctions outperform the more traditional fixed-price schemes only in the one-shot setting. With repetition, the auctions quickly lose their edge. Our results suggest that previous estimates of conservation auction performance are too optimistic.
|Date of creation:||2007|
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- Atakelty Hailu & Steven Schilizzi, 2004. "Are Auctions More Efficient Than Fixed Price Schemes When Bidders Learn?," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 29(2), pages 147-168, December.
- Uwe Latacz-Lohmann & Carel Van der Hamsvoort, 1997. "Auctioning Conservation Contracts: A Theoretical Analysis and an Application," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 79(2), pages 407-418.
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