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Dairy Cattle Insurance Will Change Dairy Farmers' Anti-risk Inputs?

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  • Zhao, Yuanfeng
  • Zhang, Xuguang

Abstract

A major problem facing dairy farmers is production risk, and dairy cattle insurance is one alternative for reducing this risk. The primary objective of this paper is to test the effects of dairy cattle insurance on farmers’ anti-risk inputs. Based on the survey data of dairy farmers in 2015, this paper selects the main area of dairy farming in China-the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region as the study area, using treatment-effects model for empirical test and analysis. The findings indicates that the existing dairy cattle insurance policies in China do not have a significant effect on farmers’ anti-risk inputs. Due to the low insurance payments and the narrow insurance coverage for the death of dairy cattle, the farmers who participate in dairy cattle insurance, will not weaken their health management measures for dairy cattle, and they do not have negative anti-risk behaviors in the process of dairy production.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhao, Yuanfeng & Zhang, Xuguang, 2016. "Dairy Cattle Insurance Will Change Dairy Farmers' Anti-risk Inputs?," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 236231, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea16:236231
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.236231
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John C. Quiggin & Giannis Karagiannis & J. Stanton, 1993. "Crop Insurance And Crop Production: An Empirical Study Of Moral Hazard And Adverse Selection," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 37(2), pages 95-113, August.
    2. Barry K. Goodwin & Monte L. Vandeveer & John L. Deal, 2004. "An Empirical Analysis of Acreage Effects of Participation in the Federal Crop Insurance Program," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(4), pages 1058-1077.
    3. Robert G. Chambers, 1989. "Insurability and Moral Hazard in Agricultural Insurance Markets," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 71(3), pages 604-616.
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