Why Are Health Care Report Cards So Bad (Good)?
This paper provides a signaling-game theoretical foundation for empirically testing the effects of quality report cards in the U.S. health care industry. It shows that, when health care providers face an identical distribution of patient illness severities, a trade-off between multidimensional measures in the existing report cards renders them a mechanism that reveals the providers' qualities without causing them to select patients. However, non-identical patient type distributions between providers, attributed to the referring physician, may force the high-quality provider to shun patients in order to signal himself. Despite this imperfection, the existing report cards cause the minimum provider selection compared with alternative report mechanisms. Since the report cards not only may cause providers to select patients, but also cause patients to select providers, the single difference-in-differences estimates used in previous studies are not su¢ cient to indicate providers' selection behavior, and cannot capture the report cards' long-run welfare effect with short-run data. In an updated empirical framework, a treatment effect will be estimated once every period.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Canberra, ACT 2601|
Phone: +61 2 6125 3807
Fax: +61 2 6125 0744
Web page: http://rse.anu.edu.au/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ma, Ching-to Albert, 1994.
"Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 93-112, Spring.
- Ching-to Albert Ma, 1994. "Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives," Papers 0047, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Mingshan Lu & Ching-to Albert Ma & Lasheng Yuan, 2003. "Risk selection and matching in performance-based contracting," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(5), pages 339-354.
- Mingshan Lu & Ching-to Albert Ma & Lasheng Yuan, 2000. "Risk Selection and Matching in Performance-Based Contracting," Papers 0101, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Kyna Fong, 2007. "Evaluating Skilled Experts: Optimal Scoring Rules for Surgeons," Discussion Papers 07-043, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Epstein, Andrew J., 2010. "Effects of report cards on referral patterns to cardiac surgeons," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 718-731, September.
- Gravelle, Hugh & Sivey, Peter, 2010. "Imperfect information in a quality-competitive hospital market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 524-535, July. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)