Adverse Selection and the Challenges to Stand-Alone Prescription Drug Insurance
In: Frontiers in Health Policy Research, Volume 7
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- Pauly, Mark V. & Herring, Bradley J., 2000. "An efficient employer strategy for dealing with adverse selection in multiple-plan offerings: an MSA example," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 513-528, July.
- Wolfe, John R. & Goddeeris, John H., 1991. "Adverse selection, moral hazard, and wealth effects in the medigap insurance market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 433-459.
- Ettner, Susan L., 1997. "Adverse selection and the purchase of Medigap insurance by the elderly," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 543-562, October.
- Coulson, N. Edward & Stuart, Bruce, 1992. "Persistence in the use of pharmaceuticals by the elderly : Evidence from annual claims," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 315-328, October.