De-mystifying the Inconvenient Truth : Does Ex Post Moral Hazard Indeed Exist in Korean Private Health Insurance Market?
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More about this item
KeywordsPrivate Health Insurance; Moral Hazard; Endogeneity; Sample Selection Bias;
- I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
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