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Adverse selection and the purchase of Medigap insurance by the elderly

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  • Ettner, Susan L.

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  • Ettner, Susan L., 1997. "Adverse selection and the purchase of Medigap insurance by the elderly," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 543-562, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:16:y:1997:i:5:p:543-562
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ettner, Susan L., 1996. "New evidence on the relationship between income and health," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 67-85, February.
    2. Hurd, Michael D. & McGarry, Kathleen, 1997. "Medical insurance and the use of health care services by the elderly," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 129-154, April.
    3. Pauly, Mark V, 1986. "Taxation, Health Insurance, and Market Failure in the Medical Economy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 24(2), pages 629-675, June.
    4. Davidson, Bruce N. & Sofaer, Shoshanna & Gertler, Paul, 1992. "Consumer information and biased selection in the demand for coverage supplementing medicare," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 34(9), pages 1023-1034, May.
    5. Marquis, M. Susan, 1992. "Adverse selection with a multiple choice among health insurance plans: A simulation analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 129-151, August.
    6. Lillard, L.A. & Rogowski, J., 1995. "Does Supplemental Private Insurance Increase Medicare Costs?," Papers 95-16, RAND - Labor and Population Program.
    7. Duan, Naihua, et al, 1983. "A Comparison of Alternative Models for the Demand for Medical Care," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 1(2), pages 115-126, April.
    8. Pauly, Mark V, 1990. "The Rational Nonpurchase of Long-term-Care Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 153-168, February.
    9. Mark V. Pauly, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62.
    10. Dennis G. Shea & R. Patrick Stewart, 1995. "Demand for insurance by elderly persons: Private purchases and employer provision," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(4), pages 315-326, July.
    11. Wolfe, John R. & Goddeeris, John H., 1991. "Adverse selection, moral hazard, and wealth effects in the medigap insurance market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 433-459.
    12. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    13. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
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