How Does Shared Capitalism Affect Economic Performance in the United Kingdom?
In: Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options
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- George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1993.
"Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts,"
NBER Working Papers
4480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Baker, George & Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1994. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1125-56, November.
- Derek C. Jones, 1987. "The productivity effects of worker directors and financial participation in the firm: The case of British Retail Cooperatives," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 41(1), pages 79-92, October.
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